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Expungement of Criminal Arrest
Records: The State of the Law in
Pennsylvania
Russell J. Ober, Jr.*

I. Introduction
Common sense and experience tell us that a person who has
been convicted of a crime suffers significant social handicaps, even
after he has "paid his debt to society."' Persons convicted of crimes
often experience substantial difficulties finding and retaining employment, obtaining professional licensing, credit and insurance, enlisting in military services and holding public office. 2 In recognition
of the obvious disabilities created by a criminal record, the legislatures of over twenty states have enacted statutes that authorize the

expungement of records of criminal convictions?
Perhaps less obvious is the plight of those citizens who are the
* B.A. 1970, University of Pittsburgh; J.D. 1973, University of Pittsburgh School of
Law. Partner, Wallace, Chapas & Ober, Pitsburg, Pennsylvania.
i. For an excellent discussion of the social handicaps that afflict the former offender, see
Gough, The Expungement af Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem
of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147 (1966).
2. See generaly Symoosium - The Collateral Consequences of a Crininal Conviction, 23
VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970). See also S.RUBIN, H. WEIHOFEN, G. EDWARDS, & S.ROSEN-

ZWEIG, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION

611, 617-29 (1963).

Comment, Expungement in Ohio. Assimilation into Societyfor the Former Criminal, 8
AKRON L. REv.480 (1975). See also Comment, Expungement of Criminal Convictions in Kansas. A Necessary Rehabilitative Tool, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 93 (1974).
Professor Gough defines an expungement statute as follows:
Legislative provision for the eradication of a record of conviction or adjudication
upon fulfillment of prescribed conditions, usually the successful discharge of the offender from probation and the passage of a period of time without further offense. It
is not simply a lifting of disabilities attendant upon conviction and a restoration of
civil rights, though this is a significant part of its effect. It is rather a redefinition of
status, a process of erasing the legal event of conviction or adjudication, and thereby
restoring to the regenerate offender his status quo ante.
Gough, supra note 1, at 149.
For the purpose of this article, the term "expungement" should be taken to mean the
eradication or destruction of the record of an individual's arrest, together with any additional
records generated by reason of the arrest, such as criminal complaints, indictments, fingerprints, photographs and internal police memoranda or reports.
3.

subjects of arrest records but who have never been convicted. Although society's discrimination against exonerated arrestees may be
more subtle than that directed against convicts, the former is even
more unfortunate since it undermines the fundamental doctrine of
presumed innocence. Moreover, in the area of employment, an exonerated arrestee is often discriminated against to the same degree as
a convict, since employers seldom distinguish between persons arrested and exonerated and persons arrested and convicted.4 The socially disabling effects resulting from a mere arrest record are not
lost on the judiciary. In Menard v. MitchelP the court stated,
Information denominated a record of arrest, if it becomes
known, may subject an individual to serious difficulties. Even if
no direct economic loss is involved, the injury to an individual's
reputation may be substantial. Economic losses themselves may
be both direct and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employment, or professional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent as a
consequence of the mere fact of an arrest, even if followed by acquitta or complete exoneration of the charges involved. An arrest
record may be used by the police in determining whether subsequently to arrest the individual concerned, or whether to exercise
their discretion to bring formal charges against an individual already arrested. Arrest records have been used in deciding whether
to allow a defendant to present his story without impeachment by
prior convictions and as a basis for denying release prior to trial or
an appeal; or they may be considered by a judge in determining
the sentence to be given a convicted offender.6
As if it were done to assure prejudice against the exonerated
arrestee, virtually all arrest records, even those that ultimately result
in dismissal, acquittal or some other disposition indicative of the
prosecution's inability to prove its case, are routinely transmitted to
centralized facilities that collect arrest records for subsequent dissemination. The largest such facility, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Identification Division, possesses statutory authority to
disseminate the arrest records it receives from various federal, state
and local agencies to a wide range of public and private bodies
throughout the country.7 Judge J. Skelly Wright describes the FBI's
4.

S. RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS & ROSENZWEIG, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORREC-

TION 630-31 (1963). This effect has even been demonstrated empirically. One study revealed
that only one-third of the prospective employers involved in the research were willing to hire a
man as an unskilled laborer where his application revealed that he had been charged with
assault and subsequently acquitted. Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10
SOCIL PROBLEMS 133, 134-38 (1962).
5. 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
6. Id at 490-91. For additional judicial discussion of the disabilities that flow from a
record of arrest see Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wilson v. Webster, 467
F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1972); Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1976), which provides,

Acquisition, preservation, and exchange of identification records; appointment of officials
(a) The Attorney General Shall--

use of these arrest records in Utz v. Cullinane':
These data [arrest records and fingerprint cards] submitted to the
FBI are allegedly added to the FBI's Computerized Criminal His-

tory File (part of the FBI's National Crime Information Center),
from which a master "rap" sheet is prepared listing each person's
name, his identifying data, the date of the arrest, and the offense
or offenses for which he was arrested; the "rap" sheet is allegedly

disseminated upon request to over 14,500 public and private agencies including the United States Civil Service Commission, the
Armed Services, banks, and state and local governments, which

allegedly utilize that information adversely for employment and
promotion purposes .... '
The Pennsylvania General Assembly has granted similar authority to the state police to develop arrest record files. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 14011o directs the Pennsylvania State Police to
Ipirocure and file for record photographs, pictures, descriptions,
fgerprints, and such other information as may be pertinent, of
all persons who. . ., may hereafter be, convicted of crime within
this Commonwealth ....

In addition PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 14031 provides,
[I]t shall be the duty of the chiefs of bureaus of all cities within
this Commonwealth to furnish daily, to the Pennsylvania State

Police, copies of the fingerprints and, if possible, photographs, of
all persons arrested within their jurisdiction charged with the commission of felony, or who they have reason to believe are fugitives
from justice ....

Thus, it is possible, even probable, that the arrest record of a person
arrested in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will be on file not
only with the agency effecting the arrest, but with the State Police
and FBI as well.
(I) acquire, collect, classify and preserve identification, crime and other
records; and
(2) exchange these records with, and for the official use of, authorized officials of the Federal Government, the States, cities, and penal and other
institutions.
(b) The exchange of records authorized by subsection (a)(2) of this section is
subject to cancellation if dissemination is made outside the receiving departments or related agencies.
(c) The Attorney General may appoint officials to perform the functions authorized by this Section.
Section 534 is implemented, in part, by a regulation contained in 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.85(b)(1978), which provides that the Director of the FBI shall
Conduct the acquisition, collection, exchange, classification, and preservation of
identification records, including personal fingerprints voluntarily submitted, on a
mutually beneficial basis, from law enforcement and other governmental agencies,
railroad police, national banks, member banks of the Federal Reseive System, FDIC
Reserve - Insured Banks, and banking institutions insured by the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation; provide expert testimony in Federal or local courts
as to fingerprint examinations; and provide identification assistance in disasters and
in missing-ersons type cases, including those from insurance companies.
8. 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
9. 520 F.2d at 471. See also Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard
v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.C. 1971); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 900 (1972).
10. (Purdon 1964).
11. (Purdon 1964).

But if Congress and the Pennsylvania Legislature have been
careful to insure that the record of each arrest is properly accumulated and preserved, they have been less than diligent in passing legislation to insure that arrest records are expunged from the
centralized collection facilities when the person alleged to have committed the crime is exonerated. A review of the applicable Pennsylvania legislation reveals only limited authorization by the
12
General Assembly for the expungement of criminal arrest records.
The most comprehensive expungement provisions in Pennsylvania are found in the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and
Cosmetic Act.' 3 Section 19 of the Act, as amended, provides for the
expungement of the "official and unofficial arrest and other criminal
records pertaining to that [arrested] individual when the charges are4
withdrawn or dismissed or the person is acquitted of the charges."'1
The expungement provisions of this section apply only to records of
offenses under the Act itself.' 5 Expungement of a sort is also authorized by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1405,16 which provides in pertinent
part as follows:
The district attorneys of the several counties shall keep and
arrange files of the fingerprints, taken under the provisions of this
act, of persons convicted of crime and shall destroy the fingerprints of all persons acquitted.
With the exception of these two limited provisions, the Pennsylvania
Legislature has failed to address the issue of expungement of arrest
records of exonerated arrestees.
II.

Judicial Expungement of Arrest Records in Pennsylvania

In the absence of comprehensive legislative authority for the expungement of arrest records, litigants have turned to the courts. The
first case to mention a judicial remedy was Commonwealth ex rel
Magaziner v. Magaziner.'" Petitioner David Magaziner had been arrested pursuant to an attachment issued in response to his divorced
wife's contempt petition. On special certiorari to the supreme court,
12. The term "criminal arrest record" as used in this article does not include records of
arrests or court proceedings involving a child as defined by The Juvenile Act, 1976, July 9, Pa.
Laws 586, No. 142 § 2, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (Purdon 1978). Access to these
records is strictly limited by §§ 6307 & 6308.
13. The Act of April 14, 1972, Pa. Laws 233, No. 64, §§ 1-44, as amended, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, §§ 780-101 to 780-144 (Purdon 1977).
14. Act of April 14, 1972 Pa. Laws 233 No. 64, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780119(a)(Purdon 1977).

15. Section 19 authorizes expungement of records of arrest or prosecution of any criminal offense under the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act with the exception of violations under § 13(a)(30), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-113(a)(30)(Purdon 1977),
which prohibits manufacture, delivery or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a
controlled substance. Moreover, expungement is available as a matter of right only once. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 180-119(a)(Purdon 1977).

16. (Purdon 1964).
17. 434 Pa. 1, 253 A.2d 263 (1969).

petitioner successfully argued that the trial court improperly issued
the attachment because he had not been afforded an opportunity to
show cause why the attachment should not have issued. The
supreme court determined, however, that the substantive issue raised
by the petitioner was moot, for prior to the time the trial court was
served with writ of special certiorari, the case was transferred to another judge who dismissed the petition. In disposing of petitioner's
argument that the case was not moot because his unjust arrest resulted in a criminal record, Mr. Justice O'Brien noted, "However, a
simple proceeding to remedy this [the petitioner's criminal record]
exists in what is now the Criminal Division of the Common Pleas
Court. Mr. Magaziner can there present his motion to expunge the
arrest from his record."' 8 Although mere dicta, this language was
the first suggestion that the courts of this Commonwealth possess the
requisite authority to expunge criminal arrest records.
The superior court faced this issue in the case of Commonwealth
v. Zimmerman. 9 Charles Zimmerman had been convicted of failing
to remit to the City of Philadelphia sales and use tax that he had
collected. As a result of his conviction, he was placed on probation
for a period of one year and ordered to make restitution. Later, Mr.
Zimmerman filed a petition to expunge the record of his criminal
conviction. The trial court granted his prayer for relief and directed
that the record be expunged. The Commonwealth appealed, contending that the court was without authority to order destruction of
Zimmerman's criminal record. In reversing the order of the common pleas court, the superior court agreed with the Commonwealth.
Writing for court, Justice Cercone noted,
This is not a case involving a defendant acquitted of a crime
whose conduct since that acquittal furnishes no basis for keeping
the arrest record alive. Unlike the circumstances in Commonwealth ex rel Magaziner v. Magaziner, the petitioner in this case

has been convicted of the crime and the only way that the record
of conviction can be erased is by a Governor's exercise of his
under Article 4, Section 9, of the Pennpower to grant clemency
sylvania Constitution.2'
The superior court subsequently dealt with the issue of expungement, again in a tangential fashion, in the case of Commonwealth v. Fredericks.2 Here appellant argued that a fingerprint
comparison utilized by the Commonwealth in his burglary prosecution should have been suppressed since the fingerprint sample used
for comparison was the product of a previous illegal arrest. In refusing to hold that the illegality of the prior arrest and the fingerprint
18.
19.
20.
21.

434
215
215
235

Pa.
Pa.
Pa.
Pa.

at 9, 253 A.2d at 268.
Super. 534, 258 A.2d 695 (1969).
Super. at 536, 258 A.2d at 696 (citation omitted).
Super. 78, 340 A.2d 498 (1975).

sample obtained as a result of it tainted the fingerprint comparison
in the second case, the superior court stated,
Finally, our decision does not leave those in appellant's situation without remedy. The clear weight of authority holds that one
who has been falsely or illegally arrested is entitled to expungement of his record and removaf of his fingerprints from cimial
files. In light of the other considerations noted above, we find that
appellant's failure to make use of the remedy of expungement
constitutes a waiver of his objection to the
22 use of the information
on file in other, unrelated investigations.
Not until Commonwealth v. Malone23 did the courts squarely
face the issue of an accused's right to expungement of his arrest record and the court's authority to grant such a request. Appellant Malone was arrested and charged with solicitation to commit
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. A week later the charge
against appellant was dismissed at a preliminary hearing. Appellant
then filed a petition with the common pleas court requesting that the
arrest record be expunged and that the police be ordered to request a
return of the arrest record from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The Commonwealth opposed appellant's petition. It reviewed the
statutory authority of the state police to procure and file criminal
records,24 together with the statutory duty imposed upon chiefs of
police within the Commonwealth to furnish to the state police, on a
daily basis, fingerprints and photographs of person arrested for felonies or whom they have reason to believe are fugitives. 25 The Commonwealth also emphasized that the same statute provided criminal
penalties for "[n]eglect or refusal of any person mentioned in this
Act to make the report required herein .... ,"26 Finally, it noted
that the statute requires the district attorneys of the several counties
to destroy the fingerprint records of anyone acquitted of a crime.27
The Commonwealth thus argued that these statutory provisions were
a clear expression of legislative intent with respect to the collection,
retention and destruction of criminal arrest records, and that in the
absence of an express grant of authority from the legislature, the
common pleas court lacked authority to order the police to expunge
the arrest record. The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth
and denied appellant's petition without a hearing.
On appeal to the superior court, appellant argued that his right
to expungement of his arrest record was within the ambit of his constitutional right to privacy. Although rejecting his rationale, the su22. 235 Pa. Super. at 93, 340 A.2d at 505-06.
23. 244 Pa. Super. 62, 366 A.2d 584 (1976).
24. PA. STAT. ANN.tit 19, § 1401 (Purdon 1964). See text accompanying notes 10 & 11
supra.

25.
26.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1403 (Purdon 1964).
Id. at § 1406.

27.

Id. at § 1405. See text accompanying note 16, supra

perior court held, in a four to three decision, that the trial court had
the authority to remedy the denial of appellant's right to be free from
unwarranted punishment by ordering expungement of the arrest record. The court further held that the accused was entitled to a hearing on the issue of his right to expungement, and that the court
below would have the authority to order expungement under the appropriate circumstances.
Judge Hoffman delivered the opinion for the majority of the
court, in which he reviewed the teaching of Magaziner,Zimmerman
and Fredericks. He also considered the "harm ancillary to an arrest
record," noting,
Thus, it is not hyperbole to suggest that one who is falsely accused
is subject to punishment despite his innocence. Punishment of the
innocent is the clearest denial of life, liberty and property without
due process of law. To remedy such a situation, an individual
must be afforded a hearing to present his claim that he is entitled
to an expungement-that is, because an innocent individual has a
right to be free from unwarranted punishment, a court has the
authority to remedy the denial of that right by ordering expungement of the arrest record.2 8
Judge Hoffman thus concluded that the courts have the inherent
power, based upon due process principles, to order expungement of
a criminal arrest record. 29 Having concluded that the trial court possessed the requisite authority to order an expungement, Judge Hoffman next turned his attention to a discussion of the circumstances
under which that authority is properly exercised:
The Commonwealth argues that society's interest in maintaining
arrest records outweighs the limited intrusion on the individual's
rights. We recognize the legitimate interest of society in retention
of arrest records. However, recognition of that right in competition with the individual's rights is properly the beginning of the
court's inquiry: 'What is. . . required is a more delicate balancing
of law enforcement needs against the privacy and other interests
of affected individuals, and a closer analysis of whether legitimate
law enforcement needs may be served in a manner which does not
unduly trench upon the individual's rights.' In some instances, retention of an arrest record is clearly invalid. . . in other instances,
the court must balance the competing interest involved and resolve each case on its own facts. Given the substantial interest of
an accused in his good name and in freedom from the disability
flowing from an arrest record, we believe that the Commonwealth
must come forward with compelling evidence to justify retention
28.

244 Pa. Super. at 69, 366 A.2d at 588.

29. In reaching its conclusion that Pennsylvania courts possess the inherent power to
order expungement of arrest records, the superior court was obviously influenced by a line of
federal cases that first articulated the concept. Most notable of these is Sullivan v. Murphy,
478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973) wherein the court stated, "The principle is well established that a
court may order the expungement of records, including arrest records, when that remedy is
necessary and appropriate in order to preserve basic legal rights." 478 F.2d at 968. See also
Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

of such information.3 °
Thus, the superior court held for the first time that when an accused
files a petition for expungement of an arrest record he is entitled to a
hearing. The burden of proof in such a proceeding is upon the Commonwealth to demonstrate a compelling need to retain the accused's
record.3'
Although Malone teaches that the Commonwealth has a heavy
burden to come forward with evidence to justify retention, a recent
decision seems to indicate that the court may have retreated somewhat from its previous position. In Commonwealth v. Mueller32 the
accused was charged with theft by unlawful taking. At a preliminary
hearing held following the filing of a criminal complaint, the magistrate found a prima facie case of theft and ordered the accused held
for court. The case was never brought to trial and it was ultimately
dismissed pursuant to the so-called 180-day Rule.33 Mueller sought
and received an order of expungement, from which the Commonwealth appealed.
In reversing the lower court's order of expungement, Judge Cercone, speaking for the majority of the superior court, noted,
Our allocation of the burden upon the Commonwealth was
based on the failure of the Commonwealth to make out a prima
facie case at Malone's preliminary hearing. Here, the Commonwealth met that burden, and the prosecution was terminated for
reasons unrelated to guilt or innocence ....
Accordingly, where the record shows that the Commonwealth
made out a prima facie case of guilt on the part of an accused, he
will then have the burden to affirmatively demonstrate non-culpa30. 244 Pa. Super. at 69-70, 366 A.2d at 588-89 (citations and footnotes omitted).
31. Judges Van der Voort, Jacobs and Price sharply disagreed. Speaking for the dissenters, Judge Van der Voort stated,
Clearly, the legislature has not ignored the subject of expungement of criminal
records in cases of non-conviction. It is highly significant that our statutory law per-

mits or even commands, expungement of records resulting from criminal charges in
certain well-defined and explicitly limited circumstances, yet provides criminal penalties for destruction or removal of similar records in all other cases. The legislative
intent could not be more clear.
My colleagues on the majority feel that the appellant is entitled to a hearing
before the lower court to enable him to present his argument in support of his right to
expungement. The lower court held that it has no authority to order expungement,
and I am compelled, by my interpretation of legislative intent to agree. Not only has
the legislature dealt with the subject of expungement of criminal identification
records in our Commonwealth, but it has fashioned very careful guidelines and declared clearly limited circumstances wherein expungement would be permitted.
Moreover, no convincing reason has been advanced to indicate that such guidelines
violate the constitutional right of any person.
I am mindful that expungement requests have been granted by our trial courts
on many occasions in the past. For the first time in the instant case, however, we are
squarely faced with the question of whether a lower court commits error in denying
an expungement request. No matter what personal thoughts may be upon the subject
of expungement in general, I feel constrained to reach this result, on this question of
first impression, by my interpretation of absolutely clear legislative intent.
244 Pa. Super. at 75-76, 366 A.2d at 591-92.
32. -Pa. Super. -, 392 A.2d 763 (1978).
33.

PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100.

bility at a hearing, otherwise his petition to expunge will be denied. If, however, such a showing is made, the court must weigh
the Commonwealth's interest in retaining appellee's arrest record
against appellee's interest in being free from whatever disabilities
the record may create.
It must be borne in mind that the question before the court is
not whether expungement is desirable in this case but whether it is
constitutionally required; that is, whether it is34necessary in order
to prevent punishment of an innocent person.
Thus, in light of the court's decision in Mueller, Pennsylvania
courts are authorized, and in fact are constitutionally required, to
grant expungement of criminal arrest records when criminal charges
against an accused are dismissed because of the failure of the Commonwealth to establish a prima facie case against the accused. In
addition, expungement is required when the accused has been acquitted, or when the case has been disposed of in some other manner
that is premised upon, or indicative of, the innocence of the accused.
In such cases, the court may refuse expungement only when the
Commonwealth can come forward with compelling evidence to justify the retention of the records.3 5
When the prosecution is terminated favorably to the accused for
reasons unrelated to his guilt or innocence, however, the accused
then bears the burden of proving to the court that he was without
criminal culpability. Failure by an accused to prove his lack of guilt
will result in the denial of his petition for expungement.
Even after Mueller the law relating to expungement of criminal
arrest records remains unsettled in Pennsylvania. The supreme court
has granted allocaturin Wert v. Jennings,36 a case that reiterates the
teaching of Malone. But even if the ruling of the superior court is
34.

- Pa. Super. at -, 392 A.2d at 765. Judge Spaeth dissented from this obvious modi-

fication of the rule enunciated in Malone and its progeny, noting,
[Als I read Malone, the burden of proving a substantial interest in retaining the
records should remain on the Commonwealth, the evidence that the Commonwealth
had made out a prinafaciecase being relevant only to deciding whether the Commonwealth has met that burden.
Id. at -,

392 A.2d at 765 (citations omitted).

35. The court in Mueller did not indicate what kind of evidence the Commonwealth
must present to justify retaining the records, but in light of the court's reasoning that expungment "is necessary in order to prevent punishment of an innocent person" id at -, 392 A.2d
at 765, it seems doubtful that any evidence would be sufficient to deny the arrestee his due
process rights.
Recently, the superior court isssued a per curiam opinion in Commonwealth v. Rose, Pa. Super. -, 397 A.2d 1243 (1979), in which it again reiterated that when the Commonwealth
cannot present compelling evidence to justifly retention of the arrest record, due process requires the record to be expunged. Here the Commonwealth failed to establish guilt, there were
no procedural defects, and the defendant was acquitted. The court noted that the acquittal
was "not a result of legal technicalities unrelated to questions of quilt or innocence" id at
1244, and that the petitioner's interest in his reputation and from being free from the unfortunate consequences of having an arrest record outweighed the Commonwealth's interest in retaining the arrest record to deter shoplifters. Id
36. 249 Pa. Super. 467, 378 A.2d 390 (1977), allocatur granted, No. 205 January Term,
1978.

affirmed, a great many unanswered questions will remain. For example, may a person who has received an expungement legally state
that he has never been arrested? May an expunged arrest record be

considered for the purpose of setting a person's bail if he is later
arrested on another charge or be considered by the sentencing judge
if he is later convicted on that charge? What sanctions may be imposed upon a person who reveals the existence of the expunged record? A legislative solution is clearly indicated as a way of avoiding
the litigation that will .be necessary to answer these questions.3 7
III.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Recently, three bills that provided for expungement were introduced to the General Assembly. 38 All three died in committee; nevertheless, none of these bills would have solved the problems
encountered by the exonerated arrestee, since none of them would
have acted to remove the disabilities associated with the record of
arrest. The Legislature could best deal with the problem by enacting
a modified version of section 19 of the Controlled Substance, Drug,
Device and Cosmetic Act. 39 Section 19 mandates the prompt expungement of both official and unofficial arrest and other criminal
records when the charges against an individual are withdrawn or dismissed or the person charged is acquitted of the charges. Section 19
requires the trial court, within five days after withdrawal, dismissal

or acquittal, to
order the appropriate keepers of criminal records (i) to expunge
and destroy the official and unofficial arrest and other criminal
37. A number of states have statutes that mandate expungement or a restriction of access
to criminal arrest records. For a general discussion of these statutes, see Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d
900 (1972).
38. H.B. 1317, 1977 session (June 14) would have amended The Act of April 27, 1927,
Pa. Laws 414, No. 270, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 §§ 1401-1438, (Purdon 1964), to
provide that "fingerprints, photographs and other arrest records shall be expunged from police
and other files one year following the date of arrest of any person if that person had no conviction prior to nor subsequent to the date of arrest," with penalties of thirty days imprisonment
or a fine of up to $100, or both, for failure to comply with the provisions of the bill.
S.B.1629, 1978 session (Sept. 18), would have amended the Act of November 25, 1970, Pa.
Laws 707, No. 230, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. by adding § 4307, providing, in the case of a person
granted a pardon, for expungement of "all material relating to the Act to which the pardon
applies."
Finally, S.B. 1443, 1978 Session § 3 (April 18), which would have been known as the
Criminal Records Expunging Act, provided for expungement in the following instances:
(1) In any case where a police agency has elected to drop charges.
(2) If no disposition has been received in the central repository within 18
months after the date of arrest. ...
(3) By court order requiring such that nonconviction information be expunged.
(4) To remove and destroy records when an individual has reached 100 years
of age and has been free of arrest or prosecution for a period of 15 years following
final release from confinement or supervision.
(5) When an individual has been dead for a period of seven years and had no
contact with the criminal justice system for 15 years.
39. Act of April 14, 1972, Pa. Laws 233, No. 64, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 780-119 (Purdon 1977).

records of that individual, to request in so far as they are able the
return of such records as they have made available to Federal and
other State agencies, and to destroy such records on receipt
thereof; and (ii) to file with the court within thirty days an affidavit
that such records have been expunged and destroyed, together
with the court's expunction order and to retain no copies thereof.
Upon receipt of such affidavit, the court shall seal the same together with the original and all copies of its expunction order and
any person or agency to examine such sealed
shall not permit
4o
documents.

Section 19 also provides that no expunged record of arrest or prosecution may "be regarded as an arrest or prosecution for the purpose
of any statute or regulation or license or questionnaire or any civil or
criminal proceeding or any other public or private purpose."' 1 Thus,
an exonerated arrestee legitimately can state on a job application
that he has never been arrested. Furthermore, the arrest cannot be
considered at sentencing if the exonerated arrestee was subsequently
convicted. The confidentiality of the sealed records is guaranteed by
subsection (b), which makes it a summary offense for anyone other
than the person arrested or prosecuted to divulge any information
concerning the case. Upon conviction, the violator becomes subject
to a fine of up to $500 or thirty days imprisonment, or both.
One provision of section 19 would require modification to conform to the due process standards articulated by the superior court.
Subsection (a) provides, inter alia, that "such expungement shall be
available as a matter of right to any person only once."'42 All of the

cases seem to indicate that due process requires expungement of
criminal arrest records when the prosecution is terminated for reasons indicative of the innocence of the accused. With the deletion of
the one time only provision, and the incorporation of a provision
permitting the court to authorize retention of the records when the
Commonwealth can offer compelling reasons for doing so, an act
based upon section 19 would be a model expungement statute.
Such a statute would end the dichotomy that now exists between
the treatment accorded drug offenders and that accorded those
charged with other classes of offenses. Prompt expungement will insure the exonerated arrestee the right to pursue employment, education or professional licensing without fear of unwarranted
discrimination. The current state of affairs often presents a very difficult choice: should an exonerated arrestee honestly acknowledge
the possession of an arrest record, knowing the possible adverse consequences of such an admission, or should he attempt to conceal its
existence, recognizing that the discovery of a falsehood might have
40.
41.
42.

Id
Id
Id

devastating effects? A statute modeled after section 19 would alleviate the necessity of an exonerated arrestee being forced to make that
choice, and would insure that no citizen would be forced to endure
punishment for alleged criminal conduct without due process of law.

